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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The entire Nuremberg process, from the London Conference through the 
Nuremberg judgement, was shot through with ambiguities on the issues of 
legality and retroactivity of criminal law. The fact that the judgement was 
unanimous did not eliminate the ambiguities – it merely saved them for 
another day.
1
 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
On 18 November 2010, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) held that legal reforms2 adopted by Senegal in 2007 to incorporate 
international crimes into the national Penal Code to enable its domestic courts to 
prosecute Hissene Habre for, among others, crimes against humanity committed in 
Chad twenty years before, violated the principle of legality, specifically the principle 
against non-retroactivity of criminal law.3 The court held that such crimes could be 
prosecuted only by a hybrid tribunal with the jurisdiction to try Habre for the international 
crimes based on general principles of law common to the community of nations.4 Some 
scholars opined that the ECOWAS decision was wrong, stating that the crimes in 
question were criminalised already under international law and that Senegal‟s legal 
reforms simply served jurisdictional purposes.5 Given that, as a core component of the 
principle of legality, the role of non-retroactivity is to prohibit the creation of new crimes 
and their application to past conduct,6 the opinions of such scholars may hold true.  
                                                          
1
 KS Gallant The principle of legality in international and comparative law (2009)155. 
2
 See Law no. 2007-02 of 12 February 2007 amending the Penal Code, Journal Officiel de la Republique du 
Senegal no. 6332, 10 March 2007, at 2377, available at http://rds.refer.sn/IMG/pdf/07-02-
12CODEPENALMODIF.pdf (accessed on 30 July 2011); Law no. 2007-05 of 12 February 2007 (relative to 
the implementation of the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court), at 2384, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Loi_2007_05_du_12_Fev_2007_modifiant_le_Code_de_Procedure_pena
le_senegal_fr.pdf (accessed on 30 July 2011); Constitutional Law no. 2008-33 of 7 August 2008 amending 
arts 9 and 25 and supplementing arts 562 & 92 of the Constitution), Journal Officiel de la Republique du 
Sénégal no. 6420, 8 August 2008, available at http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article7026 (accessed on 30 
July 2011). 
3
 Hissein Habre v République Du Senegal Economic Court of West African States, (ECOWAS ruling), 
ECOWAS (18 November 2010) ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10.  
4
 As above. 
5
 V Spiga „Non-retroactivity of criminal law: a new chapter in the Hissene Habre saga‟ (2011) 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 13.  
6
 Gallant (n 1 above) 1-3.  
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The Habre episode manifests the unspoken confusion surrounding the principle 
of legality in the prosecution of international crimes in Africa‟s national courts.  
In August 1996, Rwanda implemented an Organic Law on the Organisation of 
Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crimes of Genocide or Crimes Against 
Humanity committed since 1 October 1990 (Organic Law Number 8 of 1996). While the 
law stipulated that it was applicable to international crimes, it cautioned that this was 
only the case for such crimes as were already prohibited under the country‟s Penal 
Code.7 Such caution was based on the fear of violating the non-retroactivity principle 
embedded in Rwanda‟s Constitution,8 which otherwise could have occasioned a 
constitutional challenge.9 Some have dubbed such hesitation unnecessary, arguing that 
Rwanda could simply have prosecuted the international crimes directly since they were 
already recognised as crimes under international law and by the general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations.10  
However, there is still no agreed position on the direct application of international 
criminal law in domestic courts.11 It has been stated that international criminal law 
treaties require implementing legislation in order to have force in domestic courts, 
regardless of whether a state is monist or dualist.12  Even Senegal, for all its monism, 
was still required by the ECOWAS court to have had prior implementing legislation as a 
basis for prosecuting Habre for torture and crimes against humanity.   
  Countries like Uganda and Kenya are caught in a state of doubt and hesitation 
over the principle of legality, Kenya continuing to grapple for a legal basis to prosecute 
international crimes domestically,13 Uganda limiting the prosecution to offences under its 
Penal Code Act,14 and both countries limiting the application of the implementing 
legislation for the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) to the 
                                                          
7
 Organic Law No. 8 of 1996, art 1. 
8
 Constitution of Rwanda as amended by Revision du 18 Janvier 1996 de le Loi Fundamental, art 12. 
9
 W A Schabas „Justice, democracy and impunity in post- genocide Rwanda: searching for solutions to 
impossible problems‟ (1993) 7 Criminal Law Forum 536; O Dubois „Rwanda‟s national criminal courts and 
the international tribunal‟ (1997) International Review of the Red Cross, No. 321 available at  
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnza.htm (accessed on 30 July 2011).  
10
 Schabas (n 9 above) 537; Dubois (n 9 above). 
11
 Dubois (n 9 above). 
12
 G Olivi „The role of national courts in prosecuting international crimes: new perspectives‟ 2006 (18) Sri 
Lanka Journal of international Law 87. 
13
 Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa (OSIEA) „Putting complementarity into practice: domestic justice 
for international crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Kenya. 2011 84 & 85. Available 
at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/complementarity-in-practice-
20110119/putting-complementarity-into-practice-20110120.pdf (accessed on 12 September 2011).  
14
 Putting complementarity into practice (n 13 above) 59. 
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future,15 for fear of a constitutional challenge on retroactivity.16 This has left unaddressed 
the periods during which atrocities were committed in both countries.17 
Yet, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) military courts have prosecuted 
perpetrators for the very same atrocities committed in the past, by directly applying the 
Rome Statute on the sole basis of ratification, without any qualms about violating the 
principle of legality.18 
This state of affairs reveals a lack of consensus surrounding the application of 
the principle of legality in the prosecution of international crimes in Africa‟s domestic 
courts. This tension may be articulated, in the words of some scholars, as a conflict 
between justice and certainty of law,19 acknowledging the importance of the law but 
cautioning that when the law occasions an intolerable level of injustice then it must yield 
to justice.20 
What is especially pertinent is that Africa has suffered gross atrocities and 
extreme destruction due to war and political turmoil caused by criminal acts of 
individuals.21 In Northern Uganda, a twenty-year war that started in 1986 saw the mass 
killing, rape, abduction and displacement of civilians.22 Rwanda experienced genocide in 
which it has been estimated that three quarters of the Tutsi population was killed.23  In 
the DRC a war that extends as far back as 1998 saw the massive displacement, rape 
and killing of civilians,24 which still continues in some parts of the country, with rape 
being used rampantly as a weapon of war.25 Almost all countries in Africa have 
                                                          
15
 The International Criminal Court Act (ICC Act of Uganda) 2010, & the International Criminal Court Act 
(ICC Act of Kenya) 2008, art 1.  
16
 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICJ) „Stock taking: complementarity (The Rome Statute 
Review Conference)‟ May 2010 3. Available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-RSRC-Global-
Complementarity-Briefing-2010-English.pdf (accessed on 3 September 2011). 
17
 As above.   
18
 Tribunal militaire de garnison de Mbandaka, Affaire Songo Mboyo, 12 April 2006 RP 084/2005; Tribunal 
militaire de garnison de Bunia, Affaire Blaise Bongi, 24 March 2006, RP 018/2006. 
19
 G. Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und iibergesetzliches Recht (1946) quoted by G Vassalli „The 
Radbuch formula and criminal law notes on the punishment of crimes of State in post-Nazi and communist 
Germany‟ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 728, 729. 
20
 As above. 
21
 See for example notes 22-25 below.  
22
 „Northern Uganda: understanding and solving the conflict‟ 14 April 2004. Available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/077-northern-uganda-understanding-and-
solving-the-conflict.aspx (accessed on 1 August 2011). 
23
 „Genocide in Rwanda‟. Available at http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm 
(accessed on 1 August 2011). 
24
 „Democratic Republic of Congo: opinion survey and in-depth research‟ December 2009. Available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/drc.pdf (accessed on 1 August 2011). 
25
 „Rape: weapon of war‟. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/rapeweaponwar.aspx 
(accessed on 1 August 2011).  
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experienced atrocities in the form of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.26 
The need to end impunity through accountability for such atrocities has led to the 
creation of international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Yugoslavia (ICTY),27 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)28 and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).29 The situations before the ICC currently are from 
Uganda, Kenya, DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Libya, which are all 
African countries.30 This demonstrates the high level of importance of international 
criminal justice for African states.31 The demand for accountability has directed new 
attention to national courts as major agents for ending impunity, as the numerous cases 
to be decided cannot be handled exhaustively by the international courts.32  
However, African states are faced with several intractable challenges, ranging 
from the political and the economic to the institutional and the legal, making such a role 
seem unattainable.33 The principle of legality, specifically the core element of non-
retroactivity, is cited often as one such major legal challenge, alongside immunities and 
amnesties.34   
Given the extent of atrocities in Africa, combined with the call for accountability 
and justice, it may be asked whether African courts and legislators should hesitate at the 
road block of the principle of legality in the pursuit of accountability for atrocities. It may 
be argued that the despicable nature of the atrocities without a doubt elevates justice 
above legality and mere technicalities of law.  
Yet, there are some who sternly warn against trivialising the law in the name of 
justice and advocate for a balanced application of both concepts.35 This debate is central 
to the principle of legality in the domestic prosecution of atrocities and Africa‟s national 
courts cannot avoid it.    
  
                                                          
26
 Consider the situations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan, Kenya, to mention but a few. 
27
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, UN SC Res. 827. 
28
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, UN SC Res. 955.  
29
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF 183/9. 
30
 See generally, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (accessed on 30 July 2011). 
31
 P Mochochoko „Africa and the International Criminal Court‟ in E Ankhumah & E Kwakwa (eds) African 
perspectives on international criminal justice (2005) 249.  
32
 Olivi (n 12 above) 84. 
33
 See Putting complementarity into practice (n 13 above) 20, 59 & 84 for some such challenges faced by 
courts in Uganda, Kenya and DRC. 
34
 See for example ICTJ release (n 16 above) 2. 
35
 Gallant (n 1 above) 404. 
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1.2 Objectives, methodology and scope of the study 
More precise questions may be asked: whether the principle of legality is really a 
challenge to prosecuting acts that have already been recognised as crimes under 
customary international law; are states “wasting time” in “legal gymnastics” and 
needlessly adhering to strict positivism, at the cost of accountability and justice for 
victims of atrocities; do the victims of these atrocities even care for the legal intricacies of 
definition and classification of crimes; can prosecutions not be based simply on 
predicate crimes such as murder, rape or assault since crimes against humanity, 
genocide and war crimes are constituted by these very crimes?  
These are some of the questions that this study seeks to explore through an 
analysis of scholarly works, jurisprudence and international instruments, using desktop 
and library research. The study will focus on the debate surrounding the domestication 
of the Rome Statute in Uganda and the decision to prosecute domestically a former 
commander of the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) for atrocities committed during a 
twenty-year civil war in Northern Uganda. It should be mentioned here that Uganda‟s 
Constitutional Court ruled recently that this prosecution would be illegal as the accused 
had applied for, but was not granted, amnesty under circumstances which the court 
found to be discriminatory.36 Currently, this decision is under appeal to the Supreme 
Court.37 The significant role played by blanket amnesty in hindering the first domestic 
prosecution of international crimes in Uganda is acknowledged. However, it should be 
clarified that this study discusses the prosecution with the sole purpose of illustrating the 
role of the principle of legality at the stage of indicting the accused. The discussion is not 
affected by whatever conclusion might be reached by the Supreme Court.  
In discussing Uganda‟s experience, the study will draw also on examples from other 
countries in and outside Africa that have dealt with the principle of legality in prosecuting 
international crimes.  
The overall objective of the study is to highlight the discourse surrounding the 
principle of legality and the domestic prosecution of international crimes, and to 
contextualise it in Africa. In the process, the study seeks to unpack the elements and 
versions of the principle of legality in order to understand and assess the reasons for the 
                                                          
36
 Thomas Kwoyelo v Uganda, Constitutional Petition No. 36 of 2011, para 605-610. 
37
 „Government appeals against Kwoyelo release‟ 26 September 2011 Daily Monitor. Available at 
http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-/691252/1243006/-/format/xhtml/-/5o14gm/-/index.html (accessed on 15 
October 2011).  
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lack of consensus surrounding its application. The study seeks to demonstrate that, 
ultimately, the principle of legality, properly understood, does not and should not bar 
prosecution of international crimes in Africa, by exploring the concepts of crimes under 
customary international law, the international and national versions of the principle of 
legality and the option of prosecuting predicate crimes.  
 
1.3 Research question(s) 
The study seeks to answer one main research question: whether the principle legality is 
a bar to the domestic prosecution of past atrocities in Africa?   
In answering this question the study will address four main sub-questions, namely: 
1. Is the principle of legality absolute? 
2. Is the principle of legality under international law different from the principle of 
legality under national law?  
3. Does the principle of legality under national law apply to international crimes? 
4. Can predicate crimes be prosecuted as substitutes for international crimes?  
 
1.4 Literature survey 
There is a dearth of literature on the principle of legality in the prosecution of 
international crimes in domestic courts. The first book-length study of the principle of 
legality was undertaken by Gallant who espouses the principle as having acquired the 
status of international customary law whose application in the domestic prosecution of 
international crimes depends greatly on the framework of a given country‟s constitutional 
or statutory provisions.38 Other scholars, without referring to the constitutional framework 
providing for it, have considered that the principle of legality simply does not apply to 
acts that have been recognised as crimes in international law and law recognised by 
civilised nations.39  In this regard, scholars like Marks make a strong argument for the 
                                                          
38
 See Gallant (n 1 above) 404. 
39
 Schabas (n 9 above) 537; Dubois (n 9 above). 
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domestic prosecution of international crimes that were recognised under customary 
international law at the time of commission, even in absence of a binding treaty.40  By 
contrast, Slaughter recognises the strict application of the principle of legality by national 
courts, especially as regards the direct application of customary law.41  
 The foregoing inconsistency is recognised by Ferdinandusse who acknowledges 
the difficulty in analysing the role of the principle of legality in national prosecutions of 
international crimes.42 He recognises the existence of national and international versions 
of the principle of legality and observes that the content of the principle is influenced by 
several factors including national law, international law, international courts, national 
courts, ordinary crimes and core crimes.43 He concludes that there is uncertainty, which 
arises from disagreement among the various countries, as to which rules or precedents 
determine the principle‟s role in the domestic prosecution of international crimes.44      
 
1.5 Overview of chapters 
The study has three more chapters. Chapter two contains an analysis of the 
development, elements, underlying theory of and versions of the principle of legality, its 
application to the prosecution of international crimes under international and national law 
and its status as a rule of customary international law. Chapter three contains a 
consideration of the debate surrounding the principle of legality and its influence on 
legislation and the prosecution of international crimes in Uganda. It also contains a 
discussion of the prosecution by Uganda of predicate crimes already existing in its local 
law as a solution to the problems posed by the principle of legality, and assesses the 
adequacy of this approach as a method of pursuing accountability for international 
crimes. Chapter four contains some concluding observations and recommendations.  
  
 
                                                          
40
 SP Marks „The Hissene Habre Case: the law and politics of universal jurisdiction‟ in S Macedo (ed) 
Universal Jurisdiction: national courts and the prosecution of serious crimes under international law (2004) 
151.  
41
 AM Slaughter „Defining the Limits: universal jurisdiction and national courts‟ in Macedo (n 40 above) 178. 
42
 W Ferdinandusse, Direct application of international criminal law in national courts (2006) 221. 
43
 As above. 
44
 Ferdinandusse (n 42 above) 222. 
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Chapter Two: The principle of legality - conceptual clarification 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the basis for the divergent versions of the principle of legality in 
the domestic prosecution of international crimes and to assess and dispel those reasons 
found to be without merit, it is necessary to understand what the principle of legality is, 
its purpose, and its application to international crimes.  
As one famous playwright quizzed himself about what‟s in a name, so have legal 
scholars probed the meaning of the principle of legality,45 leading one to conclude that: 
enforcement of the principle of legality is inherently imperfect. Issues of 
interpretation of statutes and the evolution of criminal law by judicial 
decision will always remain, given the imperfections of human 
language.
46
  
 
There are those, however, who express more optimism and strive for a sense of 
certainty as regards the principle of legality.47 They emphasise its core elements and 
negate the idea that it is an arbitrary principle.  
By way of simple definition, the principle of legality has been referred to as a 
combination of rules whose overall effect is the requirement that no one may be 
convicted for an act that was not a crime under some applicable law at the time it was 
done and no one may be subjected to a punishment greater than is designated for a 
crime under some applicable law.48 From the foregoing provisions, a law may not be 
applied retroactively, as expressed in the maxim nullum crimen sine proevia lege 
poenali.49  
Some other rules making up the principle of legality include: the prohibition of 
punishment of an act by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the act at the time it 
was committed; prohibition of conviction based on more or less evidence than could 
have been required at the time of the offence; the requirement of clear definition and 
                                                          
45
 LL Fuller The morality of law (1964) 45; J Hall „Nulla Poena Sine Lege‟ (1938) 47 Yale Law Journal 
165,171; P Westen „Two rules of legality in criminal law‟ (2006) 26 Law and Philosophy 231-34. 
46
 Gallant (n 1 above) 408, commenting on Fuller and Hall‟s views. 
47
Westen (n 45 above) 234. 
48
 G Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 32; S Lamb, „ Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
lege in international criminal law‟ in A Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A 
commentary (2002) 1 733; Ferdinandusse (n 42 above) 223; Gallant (n 1 above) 9 (emphasis added).  
49
 Vassalli (n 19 above) 728; see note 45 above. (Latin maxim directly translated as: no crime without a 
previous penal law). 
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notice of a crime under the law before punishment;50 consistent application of principles 
and of the law; the rule against collective punishment for individual crimes; and the 
broad concept that whatever is not prohibited by law is permitted.51  
This study is restricted to the rule of non-retroactivity as one of the core 
components of the principle of legality,52 which rule apparently poses a challenge to the 
domestic prosecution of international crimes.   
The question as to whether or not a law is being applied retroactively does not 
arise if such a law already exists. At first glance, this matter does not appear  to be 
controversial, until it is appreciated that the determination of whether or not a certain 
form of law exists or is binding on a given state is a major cause of debate and has 
shaped how different states perceive the principle of legality, specifically, the component 
of non-retroactivity. 
Indeed, while many scholars note that the foregoing elements of the principle of 
legality are general principles of law recognised by the international community,53 they 
acknowledge that the principle of legality is implemented in different versions under 
various legal systems.54   
This chapter seeks to explore and assess the basis for these divergent versions 
of the principle in the domestic prosecution of international crimes. 
 
 
2.2 The national and international versions of the principle of legality 
 
Two significant but varying versions of the principle of legality exist. The first is to be 
found in the Latin maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which translates as 
nothing is a crime except as provided by law and no punishment may be imposed except 
as provided by law (hereinafter sine lege);55 and the second is expressed in the maxim: 
                                                          
50
 See for example, on definition of war crimes, G J Simpson „War crimes: a critical introduction‟ in G J 
Simpson & LH Timothy The law of war crimes: national and international approaches (1997) 11.  
51
 Gallant (n 1 above) 11-12. 
52
 Westen (n 45 above) 234; Lamb (n 48 above) 742. 
53
 Claire de Than & E Shorts International criminal law and human rights (2003) 136. 
54
 Hall (n 45 above) 165; Westen (n 45 above) 229.   
55
 See Lamb (n 48 above); Gallant (n 1 above) 12; H Robinson „Fair notice and fair adjudication: two kinds of 
legality‟ (2005) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 336. 
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nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege scripta, meaning nothing is a crime and no 
punishment may be imposed except by a written law (hereinafter sine lege scripta).56  
These versions have influenced the national prosecution of international crimes 
in different ways and are the focus of this discussion. The fundamental difference 
between the sine lege and sine lege scripta versions of the principle of legality is that 
while the sine lege version simply requires that the crime and penalty be recognised by 
“some law”, which could extend to all possible sources of law such as treaty law, 
common law and customary international law,57the sine lege scripta version bears a 
strict requirement of prior recognition of any crime or penalty in a written statute.58  
Explanations as to why countries opt for one version over the other have been 
made on the basis of their belonging to either the civil or common law systems.59 In civil 
law jurisdictions, which require that a crime and the penalty be provided under a 
previously proclaimed statute, the strict sine lege scripta version of the principle is 
typical,60 while common law jurisdictions, which allow creation of new crimes using case 
law, apply the broader sine lege version.61    
However, this distinction is fast fading as most common law courts increasingly 
recognise the requirement of statutory provisions as the legitimate means of creating 
crimes.62 It is submitted also that the civil-common law debate is of little significance in 
relation to the subject of international crimes, as  the ability of judges in common law 
domestic courts to create “new international crimes” is nonexistent, otherwise the  
stability of international criminal law would be jeorpadised.63  
The other explanation relates to the difference between monist and dualist 
systems. In monist states, international and domestic laws are considered to be part of 
the same legal system,64 while in dualist states, national and international laws are 
considered to fall under different systems.65 The result is that while under the monist 
system international treaties and norms form part and parcel of domestic law, in dualist 
                                                          
56
 A Cassesse, International criminal law (2003) 141; See also, notes 45 & 54 above.   
57
 Gallant (n 1 above) 14. 
58
 Cassesse (n 56 above) 141.  
59
 B Broomhall „Nullum crimen sine lege‟ in O Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. Observer’s notes, article by article. (1999) 453.33; Gallant (n 1 above) 13. 
60
 Cassesse (n 56 above) 141-2. 
61
 As above; See also for example, the creation of the “new offence” of marital rape in C.R v the United 
Kingdom 27 October 1995. 
62
 Robinson (n 55 above) 342.  
63
 Ferdinandusse n (42 above) 274. 
64
 D Sloss The role of domestic courts in treaty enforcement (2009) 6. 
65
 As above. 
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states, implementing statutes are required in order to enforce international law as 
domestic law.66  Most commonwealth states consider themselves to be dualist,67 while it 
has been intimated that most francophone states are monist.68   
In a perfect and simple world, since international crimes are recognised already 
under international law, monist states would be able to prosecute them directly by 
recognising the crimes as creations of the relevant treaty or rule of customary law, 
without any qualms about the principle of legality.  
However, it is submitted that the monist-dualist debate is not suited to a 
discussion regarding the domestic prosecution of international crimes. Indeed it is a 
misleading debate. Firstly, regardless of monism or dualism, international criminal law 
treaties, given their non-self-executing character, generally require implementing 
legislation in order to have force of law in domestic courts.69 As already noted in the 
case of Senegal, even in monist systems, courts are reluctant to rely on treaty law as a 
basis for liability.70 Secondly and more importantly, it is argued that the monist-dualist 
debate concerns mainly the effect of a treaty within a given state71 and not the 
recognition by that state of certain crimes that have been recognised already as binding 
on all states under customary international law and which crimes were only 
subsequently written into treaty law.72 As Cryer has pointed out, the domestic 
prosecution of international crimes is not a simple matter of monism versus dualism.73 
Moreover, the monist-dualist debate has been abandoned for more pragmatic 
approaches to the questions it raises.74  
It is also noteworthy that the monist-dualist divide between states is fast fading 
considering that most states no longer fall neatly into either category.75  
It is submitted that the most plausible reason for disparity is what Ferdinandusse 
has identified as the “national versus international law divide”. As some other scholars 
have observed also, the principle of legality is recognised differently under national law 
                                                          
66
 A Aust, Modern treaty law and practice (2007) 146 &150. 
67
 See R Cryer Prosecuting international crimes: selectivity and the international criminal law regime (2005) 
117. 
68
 See D Olowu An integrative rights-based approach to human development in Africa (2009) 76. 
69
 Olivi (n 12 above) 87. 
70
 Cryer (n 67above) 119. 
71
 Aust (n 66 above) 143. 
72
 MC Bassiouni „International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes’ (1996) 59 Law Contemporary 
Problems 65 & 68. 
73
 Cryer (n 67 above) 117. 
74
 Ferdinandusse (n 42 above) 131. 
75
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and international law,76 hence the concepts of a “national principle of legality” 
(hereinafter national version) and an “international principle of legality” or “minimalist 
version” (hereinafter international version).77 In Ferdinandusse‟s analysis, the national 
version of the principle of legality is substantially different from the international version 
in the sense that the international version of the principle, like the sine lege requirement, 
is broad,78 whereas the national version is like the strict sine lege scripta approach, 
requiring prior statutory law for recognition of a crime and penalty.79  The national 
version applies under national law to the prosecution of predicate crimes while the 
international version is found generally under international law and applies to 
international crimes.80 While both of these versions bear similarity to the sine lege and 
sine lege scripta principles, it is submitted that the concept of a national and international 
principle of legality contextualises better the current discussion on the prosecution of 
international crimes in national courts. 
It is argued that, when faced with the domestic prosecution of international 
crimes, national courts apply erroneously the strict national version of the principle of 
legality and, in the process, find themselves at a “false impasse” which leads them to 
engage in needless legalese and delays in dispensing justice.  Alternatively, as the 
ECOWAS court directed Senegal,81 states incur needless costs on legal and institutional 
reforms for prosecutions which can be conducted easily by domestic courts, regardless 
of monist-dualist or civil-common law jurisdictions.  
The basis for this assertion is explained further below.  
 
2.3 Foreseeability: locating the international version of the principle of legality for 
international crimes 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg prosecuted war crimes on the 
basis that, although they were “new crimes” under the 1907 Hague Convention which 
was not ratified by all European nations at the time of the tribunal‟s temporal jurisdiction 
in 1939, they had become recognised by all “civilised nations” as violations of the laws 
                                                          
76
 J Barboza International criminal law (2000)148; Cassesse (n 56 above) 142. 
77
 See Ferdinandusse (n 42 above) 222-3. 
78
 Ferdinandusse (n 42 above) 224. 
79
 As above. 
80
 As above. 
81
 See ECOWAS ruling (n 3 above).  
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and customs of war.82  Later, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE/Tokyo tribunal), in prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
Justice Bernard stated, regarding the principle of legality, that: 
The crimes committed against the peoples of a particular nation are also 
the crimes committed against members of the universal community. 
Thus the de facto authority which can organise the trial of crimes against 
peace and against humanity can … prosecute for crimes against peoples 
of a particular nation … the law to be applied in such cases, however, 
will not then be of a particular nation … but will be that of all nations.
83
 
 
These concepts have metamorphosed into exceptions to the strict application of the 
principle of legality in relation to the prosecution of international crimes. They have been 
recognised under present international and regional treaties. To illustrate, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)84 provides that:  
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed …
85
 
 
“International law” as a source herein has been interpreted to mean both treaty and 
international customary law.86  In fact, the drafting history of the non-retroactivity 
provision in the UDHR reveals that “international law” was included as a substitute for an 
express provision referred to by some scholars as the “Nuremberg-Tokyo sentence”,87  
which had been created as an exception to the strict application of the principle of 
legality to international crimes. The initial draft of the second session of the Commission 
on Human Rights stated: 
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person 
for the commission of any act which at the time it was committed, was 
criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations.
88
  
 
                                                          
82
 IMT, judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals 467. 
83
 105 IMTFE Records, Dissenting opinion of Justice Bernard, quoted by Gallant (n 1 above) at 148. 
84
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 10 December 1948, UNGA Res. 217.  
85
 UDHR (n 84 above) art 11 (emphasis added). 
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 Gallant (n 1 above) 158. 
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This provision was eventually eliminated from the UDHR on the basis that it was better 
suited under a covenant than a declaration and indeed it was reflected later in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.89   
It should be noted further that under the UDHR drafting history, the inclusion of 
the “international law” provision affirmed the drafters‟ rejection of the strict requirement of 
a written statute for prior notice of a crime.90   
As already mentioned, this threshold was maintained under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),91 which retained the “international law”92 
requirement and restored the “Nuremberg-Tokyo sentence,” using the same terminology 
as was used in the UDHR draft.93   
This broad recognition of “crimes under general principles of law”, tracing back to 
the times of Nuremberg and Tokyo, was interpreted by some legal scholars as creating a 
complete exception to the principle of legality for international crimes.94   However, the 
provision as contained in the ICCPR was never intended to derogate from the 
application of the principle to international crimes,95 but rather, as illustrated above, it 
was recognition that, given their universal nature, the prosecution of international crimes 
should not require a strict version of the principle of legality.96  
The “Nuremberg-Tokyo sentence” requires reference to general principles of law, 
as contained in customary international law or treaty law,97 for acts considered criminal 
at the time when committed.98 In so doing, it maintains the requirements of notice, and 
foreseeability which are major components of the principle of legality.99  
 
                                                          
89
 D Weissbrodt The right to a fair trial under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2001) 19.   
90
 Letter of Lord Dukeston (UK) to UN Secretary-General, with draft international bill of human rights UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/21 Annex B 30, art 12 quoted by Gallant (n 1 above) 166.    
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 23 March 1976, UNGA Res, 2200, art 15,  
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 ICCPR (n 91 above) art 15(1). 
93
 ICCPR (n 91 above) art 15 (2). 
94
 RK Woetzel The Nuremberg trials in international law (1960) quoted by Ferdinandusse (n 42 above) 224. 
95
 See Gallant (n 1 above) 117. 
96
 As above. 
97
 See „Draft International Covenant on Human rights and measures of implementation, the general 
adequacy of the first eighteen articles,‟ memorandum by the Secretary- General, 2 April 1951, UN Doc 
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recognised under the statute of the International court of Justice. 
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2.4 The foreseeability and accessibility of international crimes  
It has been observed that the national and international versions of the principle of 
legality share as an essential goal the assurance of legal certainty in a manner which 
renders the possibility of prosecution and punishment of individual conduct foreseeable, 
based on a law that is accessible.100   
Opponents of the international version of the principle of legality base their 
convictions on the assertion that the foreseeability of international crimes is doubtful. 
They posit that most international crimes as formulated by treaty law are not designed as 
classic prohibitions against criminal conduct and are addressed to states rather than 
individuals for action.101 For instance, the Genocide Convention enumerates conduct 
amounting to genocide,102 and immediately imposes an obligation upon states to enact 
laws to give effect to the provisions of the Convention.103 Such provisions render 
doubtful the direct application of international criminal law to individuals without prior 
domestic legislation.104  
Further criticism has been made on the basis that the content of international 
crimes is not precise and offers no description of penalties.105   
However, despite all these criticisms, culpability for international crimes is 
considered foreseeable given the manifest illegality of such crimes. This concept was 
operative during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and over forty years later it was 
reflected in a Canadian domestic prosecution, R v Imre Finta,106  in which Justice Cory 
remarked that: 
[w]ar crimes or crimes against humanity are so repulsive, so reprehensible, 
and so well understood that it simply cannot be argued that the definition of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes is vague or uncertain.
107
  
 
The same sentiments were contained in Justice La Forest‟s remark that: 
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101
 Paust (n 99 above) 664. 
102
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) 9 
December 1948, UNGA Res, 260 (III), art 2. 
103
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et al (eds) International and national prosecution of crimes under international law: current developments 
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above) 664. 
106
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much of this conduct is illegal under international law because it is 
considered so obviously morally culpable that it verges on being mala in 
se.
108
 
 
In fact, some scholars have reached the bold conclusion that since Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, the international community has assumed that the prosecution of such crimes is 
common knowledge.109  
Such a conclusion is not far from the truth considering that war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide have acquired the status of customary international 
law.110 Indeed, as intimated earlier, it was on the basis that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity were already part of customary international law before 1945, that the 
London Charter of 1945111 vested the Nuremberg Tribunal with jurisdiction to prosecute 
them.112  
Another reservation against applying the international version of the principle of 
legality to international crimes is the question of accessibility. As indicated above, it is an 
essential requirement of the principle of legality that a law be accessible.113 Scholars 
have interpreted the accessibility requirement to mean that the criminalising rules must 
be available to the individuals to whom they are addressed.114 Thus, justification for the 
strict version of the principle of legality might be made on the basis that treaty and 
unwritten customary laws are inaccessible to citizens without prior domestic legislation.   
However, criticisms based on accessibility are also minimised by the manifest 
illegality of international crimes,115 coupled with the argument that accessibility of a law 
should be considered in the light of the foreseeability principle and not as an 
independent requirement of the principle of legality since: 
 [i]t is inconceivable that the principle of legality would preclude the 
prosecution of a perpetrator who was aware of the illegality of his conduct 
but unable to access the relevant law.
116
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110
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2.5 The foreseeability of penalties for international crimes 
Critics of the international version of the principle of legality also base their reservations 
on the principle of nulla poena sine lege. Matters are not helped by the fact that as with 
the nullum crimen principle the nulla poena principle is understood differently under 
various legal systems.117 Proponents of the national version of the principle of legality 
maintain that it requires a written law indicating a specific penalty for a specific crime.118 
Their rejection of the international version of the principle of legality thus is based on the 
perception that international conventions and customary international law provide no 
corresponding penalties for international crimes.119  
By contrast, proponents of the international version contend, as they have done 
in the case of the nullum crimen principle, that the nulla poena principle does not apply 
to international crimes.120 They contend that a mere warning of a penalty for international 
crimes suffices, without the need for precise definition.121  
The UDHR and ICCPR endorse neither of these versions. Both instruments 
simply state: 
nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the penal offence was committed.
122
 
 
It has been assessed that both the foregoing strict and liberal versions of the nulla poena 
principle go beyond what is required under the international human rights regime 
indicated above.123 The argument has been made that what the international instruments 
require is some sort of notice as to the maximum penalty for an offence and not a 
precise definition of the penalty in order to satisfy the foreseeability requirement.124  
It has been argued further that for war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
death or life imprisonment has been the maximum penalty available always,125 even 
before the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, and these two penalties 
                                                          
117
 Hall (n 45 above) 165. 
118
 Cassesse (n 56 above) 157.  
119
 See Paust (n 99 above) 664.  
120
 Cassesse (n 56 above) 157. 
121
 Paust (n 99 above) 667. 
122
 UDHR (n 84 above) art, 11(2); ICCPR (n 19 above) art 15 (2). 
123
 Gallant (n 1 above) 384. 
124
 As above (emphasis added). 
125
 W Schabas „Nulla poena sine lege‟ in Triffterer (n 59 above) 463.  
 
 
 
 
18 
 
have continued as the maximum for genocide, as in the case of Rwanda,126 and for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.127 
Thus, a conclusion can be reached that, given the Nuremberg, Tokyo and 
subsequent prosecutions, it is recognised under customary international law that the 
international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity carry the 
same maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment, and that this is sufficient notice of 
a penalty as required by the nulla poena principle under international law.128   
Moreover, neither written treaty law nor customary international law precludes 
the prosecution of international crimes on the mere basis that there is no written statute 
prescribing a specific penalty. To do so would be to negate the international version of 
the principle of legality which international law endorses under the nullum crimen 
principle, where notice by statute is not a requirement.129 
 
2.6 The international version of the principle of legality under treaty law, national 
law and customary international law 
The international version of the principle of legality, as contained in the UDHR and 
ICCPR, is widely reflected in other binding human rights instruments such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),130 and regional human rights 
instruments such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR)131 and 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR).132 The provision in the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR)133 favours the sine lege scripta version. However, international humanitarian law 
treaties recognise the international version of the principle of legality.134  
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Certain countries have recognised and applied the international version of the 
principle of legality in the domestic prosecution of international crimes, and in their 
constitutions. These states have recognised that there is a difference between the 
principle of legality as applied in the prosecution of international crimes and the version 
applied to national crimes.  
In Barbie,135 the French court referred to the principle of legality as contained in 
the ICCPR and ECHR in rejecting the application of the French version of the principle in 
a domestic prosecution for crimes against humanity.136 The Constitutional Court in 
Colombia reached the same conclusion while considering the Rome Statute137 and the 
Constitutional Court of Slovenia also relied on the same approach in its war crimes 
prosecutions.138  
The constitutions and criminal statutes of countries such as Canada,139 Poland, 
and Croatia140 recognise the international version of the principle of legality for 
international crimes.  
A number of African countries has also followed this trend. The principle of 
legality under the Constitution of Rwanda, for instance, recognises international law as a 
basis for criminal prosecution141 and establishes Gacaca courts with jurisdiction over 
genocide and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda between 1 October 1990 
and December 1994.142 Kenya‟s new constitution abandoned the strict national version 
of the principle of legality which applied to all crimes under its old Constitution143 and 
adopted the international version, allowing prosecution of acts that were considered 
criminal under “international law”.144 Senegal also took this direction in its 2008 
constitutional amendment.145 
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However, a number of jurisdictions still retains the strict national version of the 
principle for all crimes, including international crimes. One of the most explicit in this 
regard is the Constitution of Nigeria which provides that: 
….a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence 
is defined and the penalty therefore is prescribed in a written law; and in 
this subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a 
Law of a state, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the provisions 
of a law.
146
  
There is also a category of states whose version of the principle is ambiguous. Such 
states simply proscribe retroactivity for acts that were not considered “criminal offences”, 
as in the case of Uganda,147 or simply “crimes”, as in the case of Angola,148 or “offences 
under the law”, as in the case of Tanzania,149  with no clear indication as to whether 
international law is a source or can be used as a source of criminalisation.  
The implications of such provisions for the domestic prosecution of international 
crimes are explored in greater detail in chapter three of this study.  
What is significant, in spite of the apparent lack of consensus at the national level 
and, to some extent, the international level, is the argument that, for the prosecution of 
international crimes, it is the international rather than the strict national version of the 
principle of legality that has been recognised under International Humanitarian Law150 
and International Human Rights Law as being part of customary international law.151  
Moreover, of all the countries that ratified the ICCPR, only Argentina reserved a right to 
subject the international version contained in the “Nuremberg-Tokyo sentence” to its 
constitution,152 which it later set aside through its jurisprudence.153 So, whereas states 
are free to apply the strict national version of the principle in the prosecution of “ordinary 
crimes”, they are not bound to do so when confronted with the prosecution of 
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international crimes,154 and, in fact, they may be in violation of international law if they 
do. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
From this discussion, it is clear that the principle of legality is absolute and international 
law does not purport to waive it for any crime. However, the principle is applied in a 
flexible version in the prosecution of international crimes. This has yielded discrepancy 
in its application at the national and international levels. The basis for the divergent 
approaches is explained not so much by the civil-common law divide or monist-dualist 
debate, but rather by the apparent crystallisation of the concept of a “national principle of 
legality” and an “international or minimalist version of the principle of legality”. 
One may consider also that there is indeed no need for such a distinction as it is 
the same principle of legality being applied at both levels. The difference really lies in the 
nature of crimes to which it is being applied.  The universal nature and gravity of 
international crimes, as compared to national crimes, justify the argument that in the 
prosecution of such crimes states act on behalf of the international community155 and, as 
such, are bound to apply the international version of the principle of legality in the 
domestic prosecution of international crimes. In fact, there are scholars who argue that 
those states that lack implementing legislation and yet insist on applying the national 
version of the principle of legality in prosecuting international crimes, violate their 
obligations under international law to prosecute such crimes.156  
This scenario has played itself out in Uganda, as well as in Kenya and Senegal, 
and will form the basis of discussion for the next chapters.  
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Chapter Three: The principle of legality and the prosecution of 
international crimes in Uganda  
3.1 Introduction 
As part of the effort to end a civil war which raged for over twenty years,157 the 
Government of Uganda signed an agreement on accountability and reconciliation158 with 
the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA), the rebel group accused of perpetrating war crimes 
and crimes against humanity during the war.159 The agreement stipulated, among others, 
that the government, with a view to ensuring justice and accountability for atrocities 
committed during the war, was to create institutions and adopt an appropriate legal 
framework160 to accommodate the gravity of the atrocities committed.161 An overview of 
the agreement demonstrates that the national rather than international jurisdiction was 
the forum preferred for implementing accountability.162 To this end, the government was 
to set up a special division of the High Court and stipulate the appropriate substantive 
law and rules of procedure to be applied by it. Such a division was established and 
designated the War Crimes Division of the High Court.163 Recently it was re-designated 
the International Crimes Division of the High Court (ICD)164 and, depending on the 
outcome of a current constitutional appeal to the Supreme Court,165 it is set to  preside 
over the first prosecution of a former LRA commander166 for violations under the Penal 
Code Act (PCA)167 and the Geneva Conventions Act.168  
However, the identification of a legal basis for the national prosecution of the 
atrocities committed in Northern Uganda was not an easy task. The application of the 
rigid national version of the principle of legality played a key role in inhibiting Uganda‟s 
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progress towards prosecution. This chapter illustrates this assertion and explores how 
Uganda could have used the international version of the principle of legality to enact its 
International Criminal Court Act with retrospective application or to apply customary 
international law directly to form a basis for the prosecution of the said atrocities.     
 
3.2 Prosecuting past international crimes committed in Northern Uganda: the 
search for a legal basis 
3.2.1 The Geneva Conventions Act  
It has been argued that due to the grave nature and stigma attached to the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, it is necessary for states to 
prosecute these international crimes as such, rather than relying on predicate crimes 
such as murder and rape in purporting to fulfil their treaty obligations.169 These 
arguments are explored further in the discussion below.  For many African states, the 
dilemma arising from such arguments is the often cited lack of legislation domesticating 
international crimes.170 The narrow legal provisions proscribing “ordinary crimes” are all 
they have to fall back on in order to fulfil their duty to prosecute international crimes.171    
For Uganda, the concept of international crimes under national law is not new. 
The Geneva Conventions Act, which was enacted in 1964, domesticates and 
criminalises grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions.172  Given that it was 
enacted prior to the start of the conflict, the Act availed an almost obvious legal basis for 
prosecuting the atrocities committed in Northern Uganda without concerns about 
violating the principle of legality.  
Unfortunately, even with this advantage, other technical challenges arose. The 
grave breaches regime under the Geneva Conventions is applicable only to international 
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armed conflicts. In this regard, the ICTY stated expressly in Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic 
that:  
[a]lthough the language of the Conventions might appear to be ambiguous 
and the question is open to some debate … it is widely contended that the 
grave breaches provisions establish universal mandatory jurisdiction only 
with respect to those breaches of the Conventions committed in 
international armed conflicts.
173
 
 
Uganda‟s indictment against the first LRA accused, Thomas Kwoyelo, includes grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions as one of the charges.174 Although the case 
against Kwoyelo is sub judice, it is very likely that the prosecution, by including such a 
charge, seeks to argue that the war in Northern Uganda was in fact an international 
armed conflict between Uganda and Sudan,175 on the basis that Sudan was involved in 
offering armed support to the LRA.176  
In order to prove that a non-international armed conflict has been 
internationalised through a second state‟s support for a rebel group, the Appeals 
Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadic177 stipulated the “overall control test” which requires 
proof of the second state‟s involvement in organising, coordinating or planning the 
military actions of the rebel group,178 beyond evidence of mere financial assistance or 
provision of arms.179    
Given the government‟s lack of capacity and resources to undertake effective 
investigations for the crimes committed during the war in Northern Uganda,180 it is quite 
obvious that it would be an impossible task to gather evidence that proves Sudan‟s 
involvement in the conflict to a degree that discharges the high burden of proof in 
criminal matters,181 and that meets the established international standards.182  
To the extent that Uganda‟s Geneva Conventions Act only criminalises grave 
breaches, and given the uncertainty surrounding the nature of the conflict in Northern 
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Uganda,183 it is submitted that the Geneva Conventions Act offers no clear basis for a 
successful prosecution of the past atrocities committed in Northern Uganda. In fact, at 
the stage of the preliminary hearing, Kwoyelo‟s defence counsel raised an objection to 
the charge preferred under the Geneva Conventions Act, arguing that it was not backed 
by enough facts to show that the conflict in Northern Uganda was an international armed 
conflict.184 Unfortunately, with no clear reasons, this objection was not pursued under the 
constitutional reference challenging Kwoyelo‟s prosecution.185 In any case, it is 
submitted that this state of affairs diminishes the significance of the Geneva Conventions 
Act as a basis for prosecution.  
It goes without saying that had Uganda domesticated the Protocol relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II)186 at 
the time of ratification in 1991,187 technicalities surrounding the nature of the conflict in 
Northern Uganda would have been avoided, facilitating a focus on substantive issues of 
accountability for the violations perpetrated. However, no such action was taken, hence 
the foregoing dilemma.    
 
3.2.2 The International Criminal Court Act 
It has been said that the prosecution of international crimes in Uganda‟s domestic courts 
is tied to its International Criminal Court Act that was recently enacted to domesticate the 
Rome Statute.188 However, the Act, in which so much hope was placed for the 
prosecution of past atrocities, in fact did not offer any solutions.189 The Act defines and 
criminalises the core international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.190 Unfortunately, as noted in chapter one, the Act is of no relevance given that it 
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has no retrospective effect.191  The non-retrospectivity of the Act was justified on the 
basis that the principle of legality was embedded in article 28 of the Constitution of 
Uganda.192 This view is shared by many members of Uganda‟s legal fraternity, including 
some members of the judiciary.193  
The combined effect of the Geneva Conventions Act and the International 
Criminal Court Act is that Uganda‟s prosecution of international crimes is rendered more 
or less impossible.  
However, it is submitted that, but for Uganda‟s application of the national version 
of the principle of legality, and to some extent, the role of political considerations, such 
eventuality could have been avoided. The International Criminal Court Act could have 
been enacted with retrospective application in compliance with the international version 
of the principle of legality, or in the alternative, customary international law could have 
been used as a basis for the prosecution of the international crimes. And all this would 
still have been in compliance with the principle of legality as encapsulated in article 28 of 
Uganda‟s Constitution. This argument is developed below. 
 
3.3 Article 28, retrospectivity of the International Criminal Court Act and 
application of customary international law in Ugandan courts  
The relevant paragraphs of article 28 of the Constitution of Uganda provide as follows:   
 
(7) No person shall be charged with or convicted of a criminal offence 
which is founded on an act or omission that did not at the time it took place 
constitute a criminal offence (emphasis added). 
 
(8) No penalty shall be imposed for a criminal offence that is severer in 
degree or description than the maximum penalty that could have been 
imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed (emphasis 
added). 
 
It has been observed that many countries adopt the international version of the 
principle of legality under the UDHR and the ICCPR even if they do not use the exact 
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language used in those instruments.194 It has been observed also that simply because 
“international law” is not expressly mentioned in a country‟s provisions on the principle of 
legality does not mean that the application of the international version of the principle in 
the prosecution of international crimes is not recognised,195 and further that national 
provisions should not be “taken on face value but form one step in a more elaborate 
analysis” in locating the international version of the principle of legality.196 It has been 
posited further that the international version of the principle, as contained in the UDHR 
and the ICCPR, was adapted to address non-retroactivity in common law states where 
written law is not a strict source of crime creation.197  Indeed, two common law states, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have been noted to follow this international 
version in fulfilling their obligations to prosecute international crimes.198   
Uganda is a common law country.199 The language used in article 28 of the 
Ugandan Constitution does not stipulate a strict requirement for written law in contrast to 
the express provisions in other constitutions such as that of Nigeria or Ghana.200 
Furthermore, Uganda, unlike Argentina,201 made no reservation to article 15 of the 
ICCPR. These facts provide a strong basis for an argument that article 28 of the 
Constitution of Uganda can be interpreted to by-pass the national version of the principle 
of legality, and accommodate the international version. Gallant even lists Uganda, 
alongside other countries like Malawi, Namibia, Benin, and Ethiopia, under that category 
of states which adopts the international version of the principle of legality although the 
language used under their constitutions does not state expressly so.202 If such be the 
case, it follows that the international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, being crimes under customary international law, were recognised as such 
under Ugandan law even prior to Uganda‟s domestication of the Rome Statute. On an 
even broader reading, they were crimes under Ugandan law at the time the atrocities in 
Northern Uganda were committed.  
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The foregoing proposition forms the basis of the argument that when Uganda 
adopted the International Criminal Court Act in 2010, it should have given the Act 
retrospective application. The retrospectively of the Act would serve to give the relevant 
Ugandan courts jurisdiction over international crimes already recognised under Ugandan 
law , without creating “new crimes” in violation of the principle of legality.   
This proposition gains credence when it is appreciated that the definitions of the 
core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under the Rome 
Statute are derived largely from the same crimes as they existed under customary 
international law, stretching as far back as the Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions.203   
On this basis, it is argued that the essential content of the three core crimes 
under the Rome Statute is not substantially different from the position under customary 
international law.204 In fact, it has been posited that the need to determine whether the 
crimes under the Rome Statute are crimes under customary international law may soon 
be irrelevant.205 
In view of the above, the retrospective application of ICC legislation has been 
implemented by countries such as Canada in its Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act which was enacted in 2000.206 In a bold and innovative fashion, the Act 
criminalises crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, and defines these 
crimes to include acts that were recognised as criminal under customary international 
law.207 The Act then further stipulates as follows:  
For greater certainty, crimes described in Articles 6 and 7 and paragraph 2 
of Article 8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, crimes according 
to customary international law. This does not limit or prejudice in any way 
the application of existing or developing rules of international law.
208
   
 
This provision gives the Act retrospective application, allowing Canada to prosecute 
international crimes committed even prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute.209 
It also extends jurisdiction to international crimes committed prior to Canada‟s signature 
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and ratification of the Rome Statute.210 The last part of the provision has been 
recognised also as providing for a wider definition of the crimes than the definitions 
under the Rome Statute,211 thereby addressing concerns that the core crimes of the 
Rome Statute are defined too narrowly as compared to their definition under customary 
international law.212 
This was not the first legislative initiative to be undertaken by Canada. On 16 
September 1987, Canada amended its Criminal Code with retrospective effect, to 
incorporate the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.213  A series of prosecutions based on these legal reforms ensued,214 some even 
resulting in convictions for war crimes.215 
Such bold enactments have been explained by the fact that since Canada 
applies the international version of the principle of legality,216 these legal reforms did not 
operate to criminalise retroactively conduct that was not already criminal at the time it 
was committed but, rather, simply extended retrospective jurisdiction by Canadian courts 
over already existing offences.217   
The same argument has been made and, it is submitted, rightly so, with respect 
to similar legal reforms undertaken by Senegal in its quest to prosecute Hissene Habre 
for torture.218 This concept was used also by the Secretary-General at the time to justify 
the retrospective jurisdiction of the ICTY,219 and is no doubt the same concept underlying 
the retrospective jurisdictions of the ICTY and ICC. On this basis, the ECOWAS ruling 
that the same concept would not apply to domestic courts has been rightly criticised as 
flawed.220    
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The foregoing concept also enabled a successful prosecution in Attorney 
General of Israel v Eichmann,221 in which it was stated, with respect to the retrospective 
application of the Israeli and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law of 1950, that:   
the crimes of which the appellant was convicted must be seen as having 
constituted, since `time immemorial,' a part of international law and that, 
viewed from this aspect, the enactment of the Law of 1950 was not in any 
way in conflict with the maxim nulla poena, nor did it violate the principle 
inherent in it.
222
 
 
It is suggested that perhaps the confident reforms undertaken by Canada are grounded 
in the clarity of its constitutional provision which endorses unequivocally the international 
version of the principle of legality. Article 11 (g) of the Constitution Act of Canada 
provides expressly as follows: 
Any person charged with an offence has the right … not to be found guilty 
on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or 
omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or International law or 
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations. 
223
 
 
Countries such as Uganda which have ambiguous constitutional provisions for so 
controversial an issue as the principle of legality do not benefit readily from the same 
assurance of expression, which may, to some extent, explain their timid approach to the 
principle in the domestic prosecution of international crimes.  The appropriate remedy 
would be a constitutional amendment, or an appreciation of the versatile nature of the 
principle of legality rather than a rigid and unapprised insistence on a blanket application 
of its national version.  
In the light of the above, it is submitted that there is no sound legal reason why, 
at the time of domesticating the Rome Statute, Uganda did not take the same bold steps 
as those taken by Canada and apply the International Criminal Court Act retrospectively 
or even incorporate the same reforms under its Penal Code Act. Had this been done, 
combined with the harmonisation of penalties under the Rome Statute with those under 
Ugandan law to avoid constitutional challenges on inequality,224 the International 
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Criminal Court Act would have constituted a strong basis for the prosecution of the past 
atrocities committed in Northern Uganda. 
 
3.3.1 The role of politics  
While it is beyond the scope of this study to explore political inhibitions to prosecuting 
international crimes in domestic courts, it is noteworthy that the principle of legality may 
be manipulated politically to prevent prosecution. This has been suggested in respect of 
Senegal‟s failed attempt at prosecuting Habre225 and, arguably, could be relevant to 
Uganda also.  
Perhaps the real explanation behind Uganda‟s prospective application of the 
International Criminal Court Act could be the political implications of its retrospective 
application. If Uganda in fact did consider the retrospective application of the Act, a 
pertinent question would have arisen as to how far back in history the Act was to be 
applied. This question is crucial considering that the present government has been 
accused of perpetrating atrocities in Luweero as far back as the 1981 military coup that 
was launched by the now ruling National Resistance Movement (then the National 
Resistance Army), led by President Museveni, against the government of the Uganda 
People‟s Congress led by former president Milton Obote.226  
In the same regard, it is instructive to note that when Kenya‟s International 
Criminal Court Act was finally enacted it had prospective227 rather than retrospective 
application, contrary to expectations that it would apply retrospectively as a basis for the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity that were allegedly committed during Kenya‟s 
post-election violence in 2007.228 Under its recommendations on curbing impunity and 
enabling the prosecution of those responsible for the post-election violence, the report of 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya clearly directed that 
the ICC Bill of 2008 be fast-tracked and implemented into law;229  and that it be applied 
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by a special tribunal which was to be set up for the sole purpose of investigating and 
prosecuting those responsible for crimes committed during the post-election violence.230 
It is inconceivable how Kenya‟s International Criminal Court Act, set to commence in 
2009, was to be applied to atrocities committed in 2007 except by retrospective 
application. It is also curious to note that even under a new Constitution which embraces 
the international version of the principle of legality, there has been no amendment to the 
Act to ensure retrospective application and prosecution of the post-election atrocities.  
The implication of the above observation is that, depending on the country‟s 
historical context, the principle of legality may be manipulated by political forces. It can 
be used as a weapon of attack by victors against the vanquished, as was the case in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions, or as a shield against prosecution, as is arguably 
the case in Uganda, Senegal and Kenya. Thus, in the prosecution of international 
crimes, one has to be skeptical of some of reasons given for the non-retroactivity of 
legislation or prosecution in the name of the principle of legality. 
 
3.4 Direct application of customary international law: a viable option in Ugandan 
Courts?  
If the legislative approach proves unsuccessful, as it arguably did in the case of Uganda, 
customary international law itself remains a useful source for the courts to exploit the 
international version of the principle of legality and ensure the successful prosecution of 
international crimes. This option is desirable considering the view that if a state fails to 
fulfil its duty to criminalise international crimes by not legislating against them, it may 
remedy this failure through the direct application of international law in its domestic 
courts.231  
However, such a suggestion is not made without hesitation. It is acknowledged 
that the views on direct application of international law by courts, including customary 
international law, are divergent.232 Some states only permit it where national law 
provides a specific reference to international law, others only permit it in respect of treaty 
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law and not customary law, and still others expressly prohibit it.233 The reservations 
against customary international law appear to be partly because of the misguided idea 
that it is inferior to treaty law,234 a concept which has been rejected strongly by some 
scholars, who assert that the concept of a hierarchy of laws is alien to international law 
and that customary international law and treaty law are autonomous sources of law.235  
The Australian Federal Court in Nulyarimma v Thompson,236 a case concerning 
the maltreatment of Aborigines, refused to recognise the customary international law 
offence of genocide in the absence of Australian law criminalising it at the time the acts 
sought to be prosecuted were committed. The court held that for genocide to be 
regarded as punishable nationally on the basis that it was a crime under international 
law, there had to be such an enabling provision under Australian law, failing in which, the 
principle of legality would be violated if the prosecution ensued.237    
By contrast, in Hungary‟s attempts to prosecute war crimes and crimes against 
humanity after the communist era, its Constitutional Court recognised the binding nature 
of customary international law, the unique nature of international crimes, and their status 
as jus cogens, separating them from national crimes.238 The Court recognised that 
prosecution of international crimes was not dependent on national laws and that crimes 
under customary international law were governed by the international version rather than 
the national version of the principle of legality.239 Later, the Constitutional Court 
suggested expressly the direct application of customary international law in the absence 
of clear national legislative measures for the domestic prosecution of international 
crimes.240 This enabled numerous national prosecutions and convictions for international 
crimes in Hungary.241  
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Despite such contrasting approaches, it has been argued that for the consistent 
interpretation of international crimes, national courts are obliged to endorse the direct 
application of international law.242  
Using the international version of the principle of legality, the same argument that 
the core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes already existed 
under Ugandan law prior to the implementation of the International Criminal Court Act 
and the Geneva Conventions Act, could be used to justify the direct prosecution of the 
crimes as they exist under customary international law.  
The direct application of international law has been referred to as a process 
whereby a national court applies an international rule without it being transformed into a 
rule of national law.243 Thus, where a court bases part of its decision on international law 
or uses international law to interpret national law, or refers to international law as a basis 
for definition of the crimes being prosecuted, this would amount to a direct application of 
international law. 244 In all cases, however, there has to be a rule of reference allowing 
the direct application.245 Such rule of reference may be for the substantive definition of 
certain acts, for jurisdictional purposes, or just a general rule of reference.246    
In the context of Uganda, one envisages two options: using customary 
international law as the legal basis for the substantive definition and direct prosecution of 
international crimes; or re-characterising underlying crimes as international crimes.   
The first option raises concerns as to the jurisdictional basis for a prosecution in 
Ugandan courts based solely on customary international law. Unlike countries like 
Kenya247 and South Africa,248 international law is not listed as one of the sources of law 
available to Ugandan judges.249 Uganda‟s High Court (International Crimes Division) 
Practice Directions confers upon the International Crimes Division jurisdiction over 
crimes stipulated under statutory law only.250 The Ugandan legal system is steeped in a 
highly positivist culture, so much so that it has been noted that international customary 
                                                          
242
 Ferdinandusse (n 42 above) 271. 
243
 AW Bradley & K Ewing Constitutional and administrative law (1993) 326; Werle (n 48 above) 76;  
244
 Werle (n 48 above) 76. 
245
 As above. 
246
 As above. 
247
 Constitution of Kenya (n 144 above) art 2(5). 
248
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, sec 232. 
249
 Judicature Act Cap 13 Laws of Uganda; B Kabumba „The application of international law in the Ugandan 
judicial system: a critical inquiry‟ in M Killander (ed) International law and domestic human rights litigation in 
Africa (2010) 84. 
250
 International Crimes Division Directions (n 164 above) sec 6. 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
law is virtually unknown in Ugandan courts.251 In fact, some scholars have observed that 
while there has been some progress for the role of treaty law in Ugandan courts, there 
has been total silence on the role of customary international law.252 Nevertheless, it has 
been suggested that some of the judges might, in theory, allow prosecutions using treaty 
law that has not been domesticated and may even be open to applying customary 
international law in the spirit of enforcing the Bill of Rights under the Constitution.253 
However, it is not clear whether they would be prepared to accept it as a basis for 
prosecution of international crimes or whether they intend to use it merely as an 
interpretative guide.  
Unlike their Ugandan counterparts, Kenyan judges appear more receptive of 
customary international law.254  Even before Kenya adopted its new Constitution, which 
recognises international law expressly,255 the Kenyan Court of Appeal adopted a rather 
progressive approach to customary international law when deciding a case involving 
gender discrimination in the distribution of a deceased‟s property. The court stated that 
customary international law could be applied by courts even in the absence of 
implementing legislation as long as it did not conflict with domestic law.256 The same 
principle has been applied in other Kenyan cases.257 The principle is grounded in some 
scholars‟ arguments that the customary international law is part of common law and 
national courts may apply it directly.258  
However, the court used customary international law for interpretative guidance 
rather than as a basis for a remedy, maintaining it at a level inferior to statutory law.259 
Moreover, it should to be noted that this progress is in the field of international human 
rights law. Similar progress by African courts in the field of international criminal law 
remains to be seen.  
It has been argued that in the prosecution of international crimes, courts are 
bound to interpret all national requirements, including jurisdictional requirements, in a 
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manner that allows for the “unimpeded effectuation of the different international 
obligations”.260 However, it is still very doubtful whether Ugandan courts would be 
prepared to take so bold a step as to entertain an indictment based on customary 
international law without clear legislative backing, given their conservative approach to 
the principle of legality and considering that the prosecutors themselves have not 
demonstrated a readiness to be creative with international law in conducting their 
prosecutions.261  
Moreover, at the very least, the need for a rule of reference either in the state‟s 
Constitution or a statute is recognised as necessary for courts to apply international law 
directly.262 Even the progressive approach adopted by Hungary was premised on a 
general rule of reference to international law in the Hungarian Constitution.263     
To this end, the jurisdiction of Uganda‟s International Crimes Division could be 
extended to crimes under customary international law with a view to encouraging curial 
innovation and confidence in relying on it to prosecute international crimes. The courts 
would rely also on the international version of the nulla poena sine lege principle to guide 
them at the sentencing stage.    
Given the rigid rules of drafting of indictments under Ugandan law,264 concerns 
may arise relating to the format of an indictment based on customary international law. 
However, such concerns may be regarded as procedural matters which can be dealt 
with under the International Crimes Division regulations.265   
The second option, which is less radical than the first, allows courts to use 
customary international law through the retrospective re-characterisation of national 
crimes as international crimes. This method is not prohibited by customary international 
law.266 However, it has been criticised as being prone to abuse, as judges are wont to 
exceed their jurisdiction by designating as criminal acts that are otherwise not criminal 
under customary international law.267 To avoid abuse, it has been suggested that the 
judge has to ensure that the act was a crime under international law at the time it was 
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committed, and at the time it is being prosecuted, and that the sentence imposed must 
meet the requirements of the nulla poena sine lege principle.268 
If the case against Kwoyelo proceeds, the International Crimes Division could 
use the above formula and recharacterise the fifty or so charges preferred against him, 
including counts of murder and kidnap with intent to murder, as war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. The international version of the nulla poena sine lege rule would guide 
the court similarly at the stage of sentencing. The court would have to pay close 
attention to whether the conduct of which the accused stands charged is prohibited 
under customary international law, by examining the relevant opinio juris and state 
practice.269 
However, it is not clear what real value such a re-characterisation would have on 
the prosecution or how it actually would manifest. The technical rules under Uganda‟s 
Trial on Indictments Act require that an indictment must state the specific offence with 
which an accused is charged and the particulars thereunder.270 A conviction will be 
based, therefore, on the contents of the indictment.  Thus, if an indictment is drawn for 
murder, an accused will be convicted of murder and not “a war crime of murder”. It is 
difficult to imagine how a judgment condemning “war crimes” and concluding with a 
conviction for “murder” under the Penal Code Act would be of substantial impact. 
Perhaps the added value would lie in the nature of the court‟s reasoning, the use of facts 
relevant to determine the existence of the international crime, the reliance on customary 
international law and considerations of the atrocious nature of the offence in determining 
the gravity of the penalty imposed.  
On the whole, the concept of direct application of international law is admittedly 
problematic and bound to be rejected instinctively by conservative courts.271 In 
Ferdinandusse‟s words, what may be permissible under some jurisdictions may be 
viewed as impermissible judicial activism in others.272  
In this regard, an argument may be made that in the prosecution of international 
crimes, states need not bother with the intricacies of customary international law when 
they simply can prosecute predicate crimes. 
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3.5 Prosecuting predicate crimes: a viable way out for Uganda?    
With an International Criminal Court Act that is not retrospective, a Geneva Conventions 
Act that only criminalises grave breaches, and no legal basis for the application of 
customary international law, Uganda found itself in a situation that has been dubbed the 
“zero solution”,273 having to rely on ordinary criminal law to prosecute international 
crimes.274 The Penal Code Act seemed to be the best available basis for prosecuting the 
international crimes committed in Northern Uganda without complications regarding the 
principle of legality. Indeed, the indictment against Kwoyelo was based almost entirely 
on the Penal Code Act, except for one count under the Geneva Conventions Act.275   
However, some issues arise in relation to prosecuting predicate crimes in place 
of international crimes. The first is whether such a prosecution would be the same as a 
prosecution of international crimes per se, and the other is whether such prosecution 
satisfies the requirements of complementarity under the Rome Statute. 
  
3.5.1 Homicide per se is not a war crime 
Although international law does not prohibit the practice,276 there is near unanimity 
against the concept of prosecuting underlying crimes in substitution for international 
crimes, based on the simple fact that these crimes fall under different categories. This 
view was expressed clearly in Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza,277 where the ICTR appeals 
chamber stated that:  
[i]n the end, any acquittal or conviction and sentence would still only reflect 
conduct legally characterised as the “ordinary crime” of homicide … The 
penalisation of genocide protects specifically defined groups, whereas the 
penalisation of homicide protects individual lives.
278
 
 
The case involved a request under rule 11 bis of the ICTR rules of procedure and 
evidence, for a referral to Norway of the case against the accused for prosecution by 
Norwegian courts. Under this rule, the ICTR could make such a referral only if it was 
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satisfied that the state to which the referral was being made had jurisdiction over the 
crimes with which an accused was charged.279 As Norway lacked a specific law 
proscribing genocide, which was the charge against the accused, its request for referral 
was denied.  
The overall simple effect of Bagaragaza is that a prosecution for murder is not 
the same as a prosecution for war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity.  The 
distinction between the two categories of crimes has also been made on the basis of the 
nature and gravity of international crimes. Prosecutions for underlying crimes have been 
criticised for failing to capture the gravity of international crimes which have been said to 
be “far more grievous” than underlying crimes.280  Criticism has been made also that 
reducing international crimes to multiple predicate crimes has the overall effect of 
“turning them into banalities”.281 States are also bound to prosecute international crimes 
on the basis that they are impugned by all states as shocking and against human 
conscience,282 a status which national crimes obviously do not enjoy. 
 
3.5.2 Predicate crimes, accountability and complementarity under the Rome 
Statute 
Even with such strong resistance against predicate crimes, an argument could be made 
that if the objective of international criminal law is to ensure accountability and end 
impunity, it really does not and should not matter in what form the impugned conduct is 
prosecuted.  
Such an argument may be understood better if viewed in the light of the principle 
of complementarity under the Rome Statute. This context is especially significant for 
Uganda, given the concerns that persist over Uganda‟s ability to prosecute the war 
crimes allegedly committed in Northern Uganda,283 and the crucial question of whether 
the case it referred to the ICC against top LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony, 
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can be referred back to the national courts on the basis that Uganda‟s legal system is 
now able to prosecute the accused persons.284 Such an inquiry is also pertinent 
considering the high support for holding the LRA accountable before domestic courts.285  
It is interesting to note that although the significance of predicate crimes was 
discussed during the negotiation process of the Rome Statute, it arose under the rule 
against double jeopardy and not the principle of complementarity.286 Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that the conclusions that were reached give some insight into the intention of 
the drafters with regard to the significance of predicate crimes under the principle of 
complementarity. The issue arose as to whether accused persons could be tried by the 
ICC if they had been prosecuted previously by other courts for “ordinary crimes”.287 It 
was concluded, in effect, that a prosecution and conviction for an “ordinary crime” was 
sufficient and was excluded from the exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy.288  
In fact, arguments as to the deterrent effect of the ICC prosecuting the accused for 
international crimes per se were not convincing to the majority of the negotiators.289    
The ICC later had to contend with a similar discussion in context of the principle 
of complementarity. Article 17 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute provides that a case is 
inadmissible where: 
 
The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution.
290
 
This provision, coupled with article 1291 of the Rome Statute, has been considered to 
contain the principle of complementarity.292 
The concern raised in relation to the prosecution of predicate crimes can be 
answered by a definition of “the case” in the above provision. This was considered 
recently by the ICC in Kenya‟s challenge on admissibility for crimes against humanity 
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allegedly committed during the post-election violence, in The Prosecutor v. Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali.293In determining 
the validity of Kenya‟s admissibility challenge under article 19 of the Statute, the Court 
held as follows:  
 
Thus, the defining elements of a concrete case before the Court are the 
individual and the alleged conduct. It follows that for such a case to be 
inadmissible under article 17 (1) (a) of the Statute, the national 
investigation must cover the same individual and substantially the same 
conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court.
294
 
 
Although the decision turned on a determination of whether Kenya was actually 
investigating the impugned conduct at the time summons and arrest warrants were 
issued against the accused persons,295 it is submitted that the case does provide an 
insight into the adequacy of prosecuting predicate crimes instead of the core 
international crimes themselves. The minimum requirement to investigate “substantially 
the same conduct” means that the state is not obliged to investigate and prosecute 
exactly the crime of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, but rather the 
same conduct that is proscribed under these crimes, such as murder, rape or kidnap 
with intent to murder. 
Viewed in this light, it is argued that since the ICC, an institution whose purpose 
is to end impunity for international crimes, considers the prosecution of predicate crimes 
as sufficient to meet the principle of complementary then, by all means, for the sake of 
ending impunity, if a state is able to prosecute only predicate crimes and not 
international crimes per se, as may be the case in Uganda, Kenya or Senegal, it should 
be at liberty to do so without criticism. 
  Moreover, it should be appreciated that most victims of atrocity are not the 
sophisticated or elite. Few of them know the intricacies of the formal justice system, let 
alone the technicalities of defining crimes. According to a recent survey done in Northern 
Uganda, nearly half of the respondents have had no contact with the formal justice 
system.296 And yet, many agreed that accountability in the form of holding trials was 
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necessary for the sake of justice.297 It is inconceivable that for people who have had 
almost no interaction with formal criminal justice, the prosecution of a rape or murder of 
a loved one would be of any less significance if pursued as a predicate crime instead of 
an international crime. Furthermore, it is contended also that in certain cases, such as 
Uganda, prosecution using domestic legislation might offer a stronger sense of justice 
for victims, given that local legislation designates a maximum penalty of death for 
underlying crimes such as murder298 and rape,299 while the highest penalty for 
international crimes under the International Criminal Court Act and the Geneva 
Conventions Act is life imprisonment.300  
 
 
3.5.3 Logistical considerations 
 
For African countries, prosecuting predicate crimes could mean avoiding the financial and 
other challenges associated with prosecuting international crimes, such as legal and 
institutional reforms needed for setting up of special tribunals, training of judges, and 
sometimes even employing of international judges as many have recommended.301  Such 
reforms exert pressure on states‟ already fragile economies or, where such reforms are 
dependent on donor funds, may render them vulnerable to donor influence,302 which in 
turn may compromise the independence of the transitional justice process. For example, 
Senegal‟s budget to effect similar legal reforms amounted to 28 million Euros,303 while 
Uganda‟s International Crimes Division‟s budget depends largely on donor support.304     
However, it is cautioned that reliance on underlying crimes should not be used as 
a first or long term option for states,305 for it is indeed desirable that international crimes 
be prosecuted per se for the reasons already given above. In addition, reliance on 
underlying crimes poses a risk of retarding the development of international crimes in 
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domestic jurisdictions, and may be used as a tool to entrench the hesitation of national 
judges to venture beyond the familiarity of their national criminal codes.306  
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The inhibiting role played by the national version of the principle of legality in Uganda‟s 
quest for prosecution of international crimes is evident in the legislature‟s application of 
the Rome Statute with prospective effect, the courts‟ reluctance to apply customary 
international law and the prosecutors‟ extensive use of the Penal Code Act to prosecute 
underlying crimes in Uganda‟s first domestic prosecution before the International Crimes 
Division. 
It is clear that countries such as Canada have taken bold and innovative steps 
towards ensuring that international crimes per se are prosecuted in domestic courts by 
giving overt constitutional recognition to the international version of the principle of 
legality in relation to international crimes. Other countries like Hungary have applied 
customary international law progressively in the domestic prosecution of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, backed by the express constitutional reference to the role of 
international law in domestic law. Uganda‟s legal system lacks similar structures, which 
may explain its resistance towards the international version of the principle of legality.  
However, Uganda‟s experience also demonstrates that when viewed in the 
context of justice and accountability for atrocities, the prosecution of predicate crimes 
may suffice and, in some instances, may even provide a better option to prosecuting 
international crimes, in view of a state‟s economic and social capacities.  
However, in no case should the underlying crimes option be allowed to inhibit 
Uganda‟s or any other state‟s efforts to extricate itself from the clutches of the national 
version of the principle of legality in the prosecution of international crimes. In such 
context, the national version should be viewed as an impediment to the fulfilment of a 
state‟s obligations under international law,307 which contravenes the principles of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.308  
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Chapter Four: Concluding remarks and recommendations 
 
This study has sought to investigate whether the principle of legality is a bar to the 
domestic prosecution of past atrocities in Africa. The ECOWAS court ruling against 
Senegal309 seems to have silenced this inquiry in the affirmative. However, viewed in the 
context of the preceding discussion, the ECOWAS court ruling is but a typical 
representation of the resistance against applying the international version of the principle 
of legality in the prosecution of international crimes in domestic courts.  
The study establishes that the principle of legality is absolute - it is not waived for 
any crime and especially not for international crimes. However, for these crimes, given 
their prior recognition under customary international law, their inherently evil and 
proscribed nature are presumed to be foreseeable facts accessible by all states and, in 
consequence, all citizens within those states.  As a result, while a strict application of the 
principle of legality would be understandable in the prosecution of national crimes, it 
would not be in the prosecution of international crimes, even where the prosecution 
occurs in a domestic court. This is because the crime remains an international crime, 
retaining its unique attributes as such a crime, regardless of the court in which it is being 
prosecuted. The study situates this dichotomy in the national and international versions 
of the principle of legality, the national version requiring the existence of a prior domestic 
statute proscribing a crime and the international version recognising the existence of 
international crimes under both treaty and customary international law even in the 
absence of a prior domestic statute.  
The study uses the case of Uganda to argue that constitutional provisions that do 
not require expressly the application of the national version of the principle of legality can 
be interpreted progressively, so as to accommodate the international version of the 
principle and enable the domestic prosecution of international crimes within the bounds 
of the constitution. For those African states which have clear constitutional provisions 
that impose the national version of the principle of legality in respect of all crimes, 
including international crimes, constitutional amendments could be made to 
accommodate the international version, as has been done already by some African 
states such as Rwanda and Senegal. Kenya‟s new Constitution expressly embraces the 
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international version, but it remains to be seen whether the provision will be put to use to 
secure the prosecution of atrocities committed during the 2007 post-election violence. 
Once this approach is endorsed, the principle of legality becomes a perceived 
rather than real challenge to the domestic prosecution of international crimes. Using the 
international version, states can proceed to enact legislation incorporating international 
crimes with retrospective effect. In this regard, it is recommended that in order better to 
ground the intended prosecution of atrocities allegedly committed in Northern Uganda, 
the International Criminal Court Act of Uganda could be amended and given 
retrospective effect so as to grant the International Crimes Division jurisdiction over the 
alleged atrocities. This approach would render unnecessary the discussions about the 
nature of the conflict in Northern Uganda and would enable the prosecution of the 
atrocities that were perpetrated there with the same level of stigma and gravity as are 
associated with international crimes.  
The same course of action can be taken by Kenya to enable the prosecution of 
crimes against humanity that allegedly were perpetrated during its 2007 post-election 
violence.   
This study recognises the role that politics has to play in the realisation of these 
recommendations.  This is especially true in the case of Kenya where proposals for a 
special tribunal to prosecute the post-election atrocities have been voted down 
continuously by members of Kenya‟s political circles who resist accountability.310 Indeed 
it was this lack of political will to ensure domestic accountability that eventually prompted 
the UN Secretary-General at the time to turn to the prosecutor of the ICC for an 
international remedy. The study cautions that the principle of legality may be used 
sometimes to mask political considerations that may be the real hindrance to domestic 
prosecutions of international crimes. 
By using the international version of the principle of legality, states can also 
prosecute directly the crimes as they existed under customary international law at the 
time they were committed. However, this may require certain legislative measures to 
confer upon courts the necessary jurisdiction and may also require a degree of 
progressiveness from the courts. Failing this, courts simply could re-characterise 
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national crimes as crimes under customary international law. However, the full benefit of 
such re-characteriation is not so clear.   
The implementation of these suggestions requires a considerable amount of 
innovation from a state‟s lawmakers, judges and prosecutors. Should innovations with 
the international version of the principle of legality prove to be not feasible for a given 
state, there is always the option of prosecuting predicate crimes, as Uganda opted to do 
in the first prosecution of a former commander of the LRA. As has been argued, the ICC 
does not regard this approach as an unacceptable measure for ensuring accountability.  
In fact, had there been the political will, prosecuting predicate crimes should have been 
the first option for Kenya‟s 2007 post-election violence before any considerations of legal 
reforms or the creation of a special tribunal.  It would have prevented the referral of the 
case to the ICC for Kenya‟s inability to prosecute.  
The study posits that all the foregoing recommendations can be implemented in 
domestic courts by local judges who are familiar with the cultural, social and political 
context of their states,311 without the need for expensive ventures that might make 
international criminal justice seem expensive for and foreign to African states and which 
may serve only to postpone the realisation of accountability. It is acknowledged that 
there may be a need for extensive training of the local judges, prosecutors and 
investigators in the application of new international law principles,312 but the cost of such 
an undertaking by no means compares with the cost that setting up a hybrid or special 
court or the remuneration of foreign judges would entail.      
Considering all the options available to African states, the major question posed 
by this study is answered in the negative: the principle of legality does not and certainly 
should not bar the domestic prosecution of international crimes in Africa.  
Given the extent of atrocities they have witnessed, of all the reasons given by 
African states as impediments to holding perpetrators of such atrocities accountable in 
domestic courts, the principle of legality should occupy the last place or ought to be 
struck off such a list. States like Uganda, which find themselves in a situation where 
domestic legislation offers no firm basis or no basis at all to enable a domestic 
prosecution of international crimes, should not hesitate to explore the international 
version of the principle of legality using the options discussed above.  In so doing, they 
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appreciate the unique nature of international crimes and the attendant innovation that 
prosecuting them may require. As one scholar puts it: 
 
Once it is realised that the offenders are being prosecuted, in substance, 
for breaches of international law, then any doubts due to the inadequacy of 
the municipal law of any given state determined to punish war crimes 
recedes into the background.
313
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